The 2008 election rekindled debate about whether US multinationals shift technology across borders and relocate production in ways that might harm workers and communities at home. President Obama now pledges to end tax breaks for corporations that ship jobs overseas.
IntroductIon
The 2008 US presidential campaign rekindled old controversy about the consequences for the US economy of US multinational corporations (MNCs) spreading technology and repositioning production around the globe. Now in office, President Obama has pledged that his administration will end tax breaks for corporations that ship jobs overseas. Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson's (2004) critique of whether trade liberalization always confers net positive benefits on all trading partners and Lawrence Summers's suggestions that the economic success of developing countries, particularly China, might be damaging to US interests, particularly to US workers, have added sophisticated new dimensions to the debate. 1 "Historically, US workers used to have kind of a de facto monopoly access to the US's superlative capital and know-how (scientific, engineering and managerial). All of us Yankees, so to speak, were born with silver spoons in our mouths," declared Samuelson (2004) . Are US multinationals taking away those silver spoons and delivering them to non-Yankees in a manner that leaves workers, firms, and communities in the United States less well off? Does the globalization of industry via foreign direct investment (FDI) come at the expense of US economic interests, or does it complement and strengthen the US economy?
three testAble ProPosItIons About the GlobAlIzAtIon of Industry vIA foreIGn dIrect Investment
Answering the questions posed by Samuelson and Summers about whether US multinationals shift technology across borders in ways that harm workers and communities in the United States requires a fresh examination of how the globalization of industry via FDI takes place. Economic history, according to Samuelson (2004) , is replete with examples of a nation or a region suffering a permanent measurable loss in per capita real income from the "adverse headwind" generated from low-wage competitors and technical imitators. Samuelson's concern that the United States may suffer permanently lower per capita real income due to the globalization of trade and investment rests upon two formal assessments: first, an assessment of whether the United States continues to enjoy positive gains from trade; and second, an assessment of whether the United States has begun to suffer unfavorable terms of trade. These two assessments require examining whether consumers and producers continue to reap benefits from specialization, division of labor, and economies of scale as globalization proceeds, as well as investigating the relative prices of US exports versus US imports to determine whether the United States must generate higher levels of exports to pay for a given level of imports.
The formal models needed to make these assessments draw on traditional trade theory, in which the location of production is determined by relative costs that are a function of the natural endowments of countries around the world. Exogenous changes in technology add a dynamic dimension to how the global structure of production might evolve. But traditional trade theory does not adequately encompass multinational corporate investment: MNCs operate according to a centralized strategy in imperfectly competitive markets, creating technology (including management, quality-control, and marketing procedures) that the headquarters can then deploy at home or abroad with some margin of choice about where to locate specific activities and how to integrate the stages of production. Therefore, standing apart from a formal assessment of trade effects and tests of whether the United States continues to enjoy gains from trade and favorable terms of trade is a separate concern about the consequences of the behavior of MNCs in the contemporary period. Preoccupation with MNCs' transfer of technology and their placement of production pervades Samuelson's critique and reappears in Summers's commentary. This preoccupation takes three forms: (1) that US multinationals may follow a strategy that leads them to abandon the US economy, leaving workers and communities with few appealing alternatives after the multinationals have left; (2) worse, that US MNCs may not just abandon sites in the United States but may actually drain capital, substitute production abroad for exports, and "hollow out" the US economy in a zero-sum process that damages those left behind; and (3) worst, that US MNCs may deploy a rentgathering apparatus that switches from sharing supranormal profits and externalities with US workers and communities to extracting rents from the United States.
These concerns cannot be ignored. The globalization of economic activities is no longer simply a function of impersonally evolving trade flows. Multinational corporations are a major force in creating technology, in establishing the international structure of production, in determining the location of high-value jobs and activities, and in dictating the consequent patterns of trade. Indeed, for the United States, some thirty percent of all goods exports and twenty-six percent of all services exports are intrafirm transactions within the confines of multinational corporations themselves (Council of Economic Advisors 2008, 90) . But do multinational investors, following their own self-interested, profit-driven strategies, deploy their operations in ways that are disadvantageous or harmful to the economic interests of their home countries, which for Samuelson and Summers means the United States? Each of the three concerns discussed above contains a hypothetical outcome that can be compared with contemporary evidence from the United States and other home countries.
outwArd fdI And AbAndonment of the home economy
The first proposition that underlies Samuelson's and Summers's critique of the globalization of industry is that developed-country MNCs' self-interested actions, taken without regard to their country of origin, lead them to abandon former sites, leaving workers and communities in their home economies bereft of productive activities and well-paying alternatives. This proposition has its origin in an analogy. Samuelson (2004) England locations were forced to turn to other industries, almost all of which were lower paying and less desirable than the departed textile and shoe companies. It took many decades for appealing alternatives to emerge, and when they did, the new industries owed nothing to the original textile, shoe, and other manufacturing firms that had departed.
How closely does this analogy with the move of New England manufacturing to the low-wage South match our evidence about outward manufacturing FDI during the contemporary period? To be sure, the globalization of industry via trade and investment does result in US companies relocating their operations abroad, as examined below. It also results in the dislocation of workers and forces communities to search for new industries. But US multinationals that are globalizing their economic activities also maintain an ongoing presence in the United States, unlike early twentieth-century New England manufacturing, which entirely abandoned its original communities.
A US multinational corporation is defined as a business enterprise headquartered in the United
States that has a 10-percent ownership stake or more in at least one affiliate in another country. In absolute numbers, the ranks of US multinationals are rather small; less than 1 percent of all US firms, for Over time, US multinationals have increased both employment and output in an absolute sense, with a slightly rising share of total US output and a slightly declining share of total US employment. In 1982, the first year for which annual employment data were collected, US multinationals employed 18.7 million American workers, or 25 percent of the total workforce, while by 2006 US MNCs employed 21.9 million workers, or 19 percent of the total workforce (BEA 2008a and Mataloni 2008) . In 1994, the first year for which annual output data were collected, the value of domestic output by US MNCs was $1.3 trillion, or 24 percent of total private US output, while in 2006 the value of domestic output was $2.5 trillion, or 25 percent of total private US output. In cyclical terms, US MNC output and employment When analyzing job creation, it is logical to expect that US MNCs will create jobs in line with the relative growth rates of the countries where they have operations. Not only does the United States sometimes grow more slowly than other markets, but US operations are likely to be more capital intensive, R&D intensive, and skill intensive-and hence fewer in number-than more labor-intensive production and assembly activities in the developing world. Therefore, an assessment of how US MNCs contribute to the US economy should not depend on whether the absolute number or growth rate of jobs created by US MNCs at home and abroad happen to be equal or not.
The principal contribution that US MNCs should be expected to make to the US economy is to reallocate economic activity in ways that raise US living standards. Here, benefits emerge in the form of the newer, better, cheaper, and more-reliable goods and services that US MNCs produce at home and import from abroad, as well as from the competition they generate in the economy more broadly.
Another important measurement is the specific kinds of jobs and activities that US MNCs generate at home. The plants of US MNCs are the most productive in the United States in terms of both total factor productivity, which is 4.2 percent higher than at large domestic firms and 11.1 percent higher than at small domestic firms, and labor productivity, which is 16.6 percent higher than at large domestic firms and 44.6 percent higher than at small domestic firms (Doms and Jensen 1998) . They are also the most (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2005) .
In terms of raising US living standards by improving access to good jobs, foreign-owned plants in the United States are more capital intensive, more productive, use a higher proportion of nonproduction workers, and pay higher wages than the average US-owned plant (Doms and Jensen 1998) . Controlling for industry, size, plant age, and state, foreign-owned plants in the United States still show better operating characteristics than domestically owned plants. Foreign-owned plants pay wages 2.5-7 percent higher than at comparable domestic plants (Richardson 2005a) . The performance of the US affiliates of foreign MNCs is second only to the performance of the US plants of US MNCs.
2. Information on the Survey of Manufacturing Technology can be found at www.census.gov/econ/.
3. Rugman (2005) reported that these 500 largest MNCs account for more than 90 percent of the world's stock of FDI, but did not provide more detail on these stocks or flows.
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The inflows of foreign investment into the United States constitute an important channel for technology spillovers to domestic companies, especially in high-tech sectors. Keller and Yeaple (2008) calculated that the Volt after it is launched, GM has also announced plans to build its own battery plant, relying on the technology and production experience gained from its association with LC Chemicals.
Turning to US exports, the majority of US goods exports are manufactured within MNC networks. Thus the globalization of industry in the contemporary period leaves the United States with a highperformance, high-productivity, high value-added core that exploits the evolving comparative advantages of the United States. To be sure, these activities may be located in different sites from before-in RaleighDurham, Austin, Palo Alto, and Seattle rather than in Detroit, Gary, and Toledo-and the costs of churn and displacement are no less real in the contemporary period than they were a century ago. But public concern and public policy should concentrate on dealing with these genuine burdens of displacement rather than on inaccurate and misleading analogies with twentieth-century manufacturing in New
England.
outwArd fdI, runAwAy PlAnts, And lost cAPItAl
The second testable proposition in Samuelson's and Summers's critiques of globalization envisions a fate worse than abandonment, namely that outward investment by US multinationals substitutes external production for exports, drains off capital, and "hollows out" the US economy in a zero-sum process that damages those left behind. This proposition contains two distinct assertions: first, that outward investment by US MNCs replaces exports that would have been produced by US plants with external production; and second, that outward investment by US MNCs siphons off capital, replacing investment that would have been made in the United States. The common theme to these two assertions is that outward investment by US MNCs is a win-lose phenomenon that harms the US economy.
The concern that US MNCs would use production abroad to substitute for exports that otherwise would have been manufactured in the United States has a long and venerable history, beginning with the Burke-Hartke legislation (sponsored by the AFL-CIO) in the 1970s and culminating, at least rhetorically, in Ross Perot's "great sucking sound" claim about NAFTA (Bergsten, Horst, and Moran 1978) . But does the evidence from the United States and other developed countries show that MNC production abroad actually substitutes for exports that otherwise would have been produced in the home economy?
To determine the answer, it is crucial to look closely at the counterfactual-what would happen in the home economy if the MNC did not make the outward investment-both to evaluate the substitution hypothesis and to assess the often-suggested policy proposal of making it more expensive and difficult for
MNCs to build plants abroad. A pioneer in the testing of the substitution-hypothesis was Thomas Horst (Bergsten, Horst, and Moran 1978, chapter 3) . Subsequent analysis has grown increasingly sophisticated;
but reviewing Horst's approach is particularly useful since his methodology permits clear assessment of the counterfactual outcome of no outward investment by MNCs. To conduct a fair test, it is not enough 9 to simply acknowledge that MNCs invest more at home and export more from home plants than the typical home-country firm. As Host noted, MNCs are not typical or average: They are larger, conduct more R&D, engage in more advertising, and have other characteristics that set them apart. MNCs should be expected to do even more investment at home or engage in even more exporting from home plants.
To discover, then, whether US MNCs substitute production abroad for exports from the United States, we should compare "likes with likes"-that is, we must compare the export behavior of large firms, firms with high R&D spending, and firms with extensive advertising that undertake outward investment with the export behavior of comparable firms that do not undertake outward investment.
The table constructed from Horst's data (table 2) goes beyond this. The table compares the export behavior (exports as a percentage of domestic shipments) of similar firms using four measurements: the export performance of firms that do not invest abroad (first column), the export performance of firms that engage in minimal outward investment (second column), the export performance of firms with substantial outward investment (third column), and the export performance of firms that have thoroughly globalized their production (fourth column).
This set of like-with-like comparisons demonstrates that US firms that undertake outward investment actually achieve higher levels of exports as a percentage of domestic shipments than firms that stay at home in the United States. This superior export performance, a demonstration of superior competitiveness in the face of global pressures, increases as they further globalize their operations. The percentage of domestic shipments that leave the home market for external markets rises as MNCs engage in greater international investment. 6 This demonstrates that outward investment by US MNCs enhances 6. The exact relationship in the fourth column is somewhat murky in these data, but subsequent statistical analyses, discussed below, show a positive correlation between greater international investment and exports as a percentage of domestic shipments. controlling for firm characteristics, between outward investment and exports for all levels of investment. They also discovered that the level of manufacturing activity by US firms in a given country was positively associated with US exports from the same industries to that country and negatively associated with exports to that country by producers of rival nationalities. Along the same lines, they noted that the presence of foreign multinationals in a given country was negatively correlated with US exports to that country and positively correlated with foreign countries' exports. In a somewhat mercantilistic vein, they concluded that direct investment by US MNCs in any one country tended to increase US exports to and US market shares in that country and to reduce those of producers of rival nationalities, while foreign MNCs' operations tended to raise their countries' exports and market shares and to reduce those of US firms. A smaller US MNC presence outside of the United States would reduce US exports to and market share in other countries. Lipsey and Weiss's counterfactual outcome was the same as Horst's: Reducing the outward investment of home-country MNCs would hurt the access of home-country workers to export-related jobs. A later study by Lipsey and Weiss (1984) showed that the complementarity between outward investment and exports was strong not only for intermediate goods sent abroad for further processing but also for the exports of finished products shipped by parent US firms. This same study also (Brainard and Riker 1997) .
Turning now to the contention that outward investment on the part of US MNCs "drains off" capital that otherwise would have been invested in the United States, the evidence also suggests complementarity rather than zero-sum dynamics in parent-MNC strategy. Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) discovered that years in which American multinational firms made greater capital expenditures abroad coincided with greater capital spending by the same firms in the United States. But the correlation between the domestic and foreign growth rates of multinational firms may be due to other reasons than an interaction between operations in both locales-a pharmaceutical company may discover a new drug or a software company may develop a new process that leads to simultaneous increases in activity at home and abroad. So Desai, Foley, and Hines (2005) used an instrumental variable that would predict foreign investment but not directly affect domestic operations. Their instrumental variable is a firm-specific weighted average of foreign GDP growth, which can be used to forecast the growth rates of foreign investment made by the multinational. These predicted growth rates in turn can be traced back in order to possibly explain related changes in home-country activity by the multinational. Using this procedure, they found that 10 percent greater foreign investment by the multinational triggers 2.2 percent additional domestic investment. They have also showed similar positive relationships between foreign investment and home-country exports, R&D spending, numbers of employees, and employee compensation (Desai, Foley, and Hines forthcoming).
The evidence suggests that outward investment is an integral part of MNC strategy to maximize the competitive position of the corporation as a whole, a goal for which headquarters raises the needed amount of capital from sources all around the globe. In determining where to deploy capital and where to 1 locate production, relative costs, including relative wages and benefits as well as relative skills and relative productivity, play a definite role, but in the end operations at home and operations abroad complement each other, as the MNC parent tries to deploy tangible and intangible assets in the most productive and most profitable way possible. As pointed out earlier, US MNC plants accounted for 51 percent of all US goods exports in 2006, of which 38 percent were shipped directly to overseas affiliates of the US parent.
The finding that firms engaging in outward FDI export more from their domestic market than similar firms not engaging in outward investment bears directly on the composition of good and bad jobs in the home-country market, since export-related jobs across all developed countries offer a wage and benefit premium in comparison with jobs in comparable firms. In the United States export jobs pay wages
10-11 percent higher than nonexport-related jobs (Richardson 2005a). Thus outward investment by US
MNCs results in a higher proportion of US jobs with relatively high wages and benefits compared with jobs with lower wages and benefits.
The benefits that accrue to US companies that engage in outward investment are not limited to their superior export performance. US MNCs that invest abroad use frontier production processes in their US plants more frequently, have higher levels of worker productivity, and enjoy more-rapid growth rates of overall productivity than firms that do not invest abroad (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott 2005) . US firms that engage in outward investment pay their blue-collar production workers 7-15 percent more than comparable firms that do not invest abroad: 7 percent more in large US MNC plants and 15 percent more in small US MNC plants (Richardson 2005b) . Given their higher productivity, US firms that invest abroad enjoy lower levels of bankruptcy and are less likely to suffer job losses than similar firms that do not engage in outward investment. This outcome makes intuitive sense, but contrasts strongly with conventional wisdom: Contrary to popular perception, outward investment by US MNCs leads to a more-stable job base at home.
To be sure, these findings do not imply that the domestic industrial sector from which the outward investment originates is always expanding on a net basis. What is striking, however, is that US firms that engage in outward investment offer better prospects for their workers than firms that do not in both expanding and contracting industries. Home-country companies in contracting sectors that are globally engaged, to use Richardson's characterization-importing, exporting, engaging in outward investment, or connected to inward investors-are the most successful participants in those sectors. Across sectors, whether expanding or declining, the superior benefits associated with globally engaged firms accrue to average-skilled as well as high-skilled workers, to union members as well as nonunion workers, to minorities, and to those who live in small towns as well as large urban areas.
A good example of this result in a declining sector is the family history of "Pam's family" that Lewis and Richardson (2001) managers, engineers, and other staff in the United States and 37,000 abroad, mostly production-line personnel.
Across the spectrum of specific uses, disc drives have an extremely short production life-cycle. Overall, as some sectors expand and other sectors contract there will surely be job losses and dislocations for some workers, while others gain new opportunities. Indeed Bernard and Jensen (2007) have showed that once favorable plant characteristics such as size, plant age, and the employment of skilled labor are controlled for, US MNC-owned plants are more likely to close, justifying anxiety on the part of their better treated workers. Multinational firms simply have more readily available margins to adjust than nonmultinationals: They can make changes in the mix of technology, marketing, and supplier inputs more easily than nonmultinationals and can respond to changes in market conditions more rapidly. They embody attributes that are extraordinarily valuable to the domestic economy (frontier practices, large scale operations, superior jobs) that nonmultinationals possess less often, but accompanying these attributes are more-rapid mechanisms for adjustment.
Changing patterns of MNC investment, like changing patterns of technology deployment more generally, contribute to job losses and dislocations for some workers as well as to new opportunities for others. The appropriate response for home-country authorities is to design adjustment and retraining programs to cushion the impact on those adversely affected, not to impede capital flows and engage in a futile effort to preserve jobs in uncompetitive home-country economic activities.
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outwArd Investment, strAteGIc trAde theory, And the cAPture of "rents" AbroAd
The third testable proposition in Samuelson's and Summers's critiques of globalization embodies the most nightmarish scenario of all: that US MNCs may switch from sharing supranormal profits and externalities with US workers and communities to extracting rents from the United States. The theory behind FDI is that companies take the trouble to build plants and coordinate activities across borders, rather than simply selling products or licensing technology, because they possess intangible assets that afford them higher profits when they maintain control over all operations. FDI takes place only in industries where 10. For an agenda of retraining and adjustment policies for the United States, see Kletzer and Rosen (2005) and Rosen (2008). markets are not perfectly competitive. The presumption is that successful multinational corporations can collect rents from their activities, some of which may be shared with their workers and generate externalities that benefit countries where their operations are located.
The United States may not "necessarily benefit from the economic success of its trading partners,"
argued Larry Summers, if the economies of those trading partners are powered by multinational corporations, thereby shifting rent collection to the new host states. 11 "Stateless elites whose allegiance is to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interests of the nation where they Could this be changing? The data presented above showing FDI taking place predominantly in higher-skilled rather than in the lowest-skilled activities suggest that it may be. But this evolution probably fits better with Vernon's (1966) product-cycle model of gradual dispersion of middle-skilled assembly operations than with Brander and Spencer's (1981) strategic trade model of one highest-rent, highest-externality location abruptly replacing another. These FDI activities are not the "commanding heights" of highest-rent strategic trade industries and do not appear to be heading in that direction very rapidly (Krugman 1986 ).
In the case of China, where concerns about FDI helping to create a new technological superstate are highest (Preeg 2008) , multinational corporate investment helped to propel a substantial shift between 1992 and 2005 from agriculture and apparel manufacturing to electronics and machinery manufacturing, including computers, telecom equipment, electrical machinery, and office machines. These latter sectors are considerably more sophisticated and skill intensive than the former (Rodrick 2006) . But the data show that this outcome is largely due to the increased skill content of inputs from Taiwan, Japan, and the United States that are then assembled within China for export. Leaving aside the duty-free intermediates that make up the final electronic and machinery products, Lardy (2005) and Amiti and Freund (2008) observed that it is not clear that there has been a significant change in the skill content of China's own processing activities.
As for the possibility of extracting rents from US consumers or generating adverse terms of trade for the United States, the evidence shows just the opposite: the average prices of goods exported from China to the United States fell by an average of 1.5 percent per year between 1997 and 2005 (Amiti and Freund 2008) . Schott (2006) found that while China exports more products in common with OECD countries than would be expected given the country's level of development (largely due to the benefits of FDI), Chinese exports sell for a substantial discount relative to OECD varieties of the same product.
The reason seems to be that quality upgrades in each product category take place more rapidly within OECD countries than within China. At the end of the day, the data show no more than that US workers and managers may be less unique in their ability to extract rents from outsiders, rather than revealing that multinational investment has allowed foreign workers and managers to develop some new, powerful ability to extract rents from Americans.
conclusIons And PolIcy ImPlIcAtIons
The analysis presented here shows that the globalization of industry and services via FDI may well be,
as Lori Wallach has said, trade on steroids. But the pejorative connotations associated with this phrase are almost entirely inaccurate empirically. To be sure, FDI generates losers as well as winners. But multinational corporations do not spread technology and capital in ways that harm the aggregate interests of workers in developed countries. Multinational corporations do not locate their operations in a zerosum manner that favors host economies at the expense of the home economy. The two-way flow of inward and outward investment does not result in anything like a "hollowing out" of the home economy.
Outward FDI from the United States, or from other home countries, is understandably the most controversial phenomenon. Multinational corporations do close plants at home and build plants abroad, and these firms demonstrably threaten workers during labor negotiations that they will ship jobs overseas if the workers ask for too much. But the evidence consistently shows that the expansion of MNC operations abroad and the strengthening of MNC operations in their home countries are complementary, and the answer to the counterfactual-would the home country or home-country workers be better off, if home-country MNCs were prevented from engaging in outward investment-is over and over again negative. Of particular note is the empirical support for Richardson's observation that outward FDI takes place in both declining and ascendant industries, but in both kinds of industries 19 firms that are globally engaged, including involved in FDI, show superior performance to their counterparts that are not.
President Obama has pledged that his administration will end tax breaks for corporations that ship jobs overseas. At the center of this proposal is an end of deferral for US multinationals. At first glance, the evidence presented above would appear to support such a position, as it seems to reinforce the "classical" conclusion that countries should try to equalize the tax burden on foreign and domestic income so that multinationals make investment decisions based entirely on commercial considerations not tax concerns-i.e., capital export neutrality. 12 But while capital export neutrality ostensibly justifies the elimination of deferral, the latest assessments by Hufbauer suggest that this would be counterproductive: US tax policy already places US multinational operations in the United States at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis rival multinationals. 13 Hufbauer and Kim (2009) recommended that the US tax regime be shifted toward a territorial system, coupled with favorable expense allocation rules: The United States would tax all income earned at home, but would not tax active business income earned abroad.
The data introduced here show that it would be unwise in the extreme to make the United States a less-favorable setting from which to conduct international business activities. Today US multinational corporations concentrate more than 70 percent of their operations here in the United States, constituting the most technology-intensive and productive segment of the American economy and offering higher wages and benefits than other companies as a result. They now conduct more than three quarters of all US private-sector R&D.
Using the US economy as the base for integrating their global operations, which includes engaging in outward investment, strengthens the domestic operations of US MNCs and allows them to generate more exports (and thus more higher-paying, export-related jobs) than firms that do not engage in outward investment. Making it more difficult to engage in outward investment would not strengthen the US economy. Quite the contrary, placing obstacles in the way of US multinationals' global operations would leave them and their suppliers, their workers, and the communities where their US facilities are located worse off and less competitive in the world economy.
12. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978) calculated that US tax policy was closer to capital export neutrality than commonly supposed. Deferral gave outward investment only a small advantage, which was offset by the denial of the US investment tax credit and ADR acceleration of depreciation. 
